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Product ratings are commonplace on large online platforms, like Airbnb and Ama-
zon Marketplace. One use for these ratings is to order search results. Platform
owners are able to choose the extent to which ratings can be used to determine the
probability a given seller is observed by a sets of buyers. Since demand is higher
for high quality products, there is an incentive to increase the probability that
highly-rated sellers are observed by biasing search results towards them. However,
biasing search results in this way results in competition being more concentrated,
reducing prices. The extent to which it is protable to use ratings as a means of
ordering search results depends on the properties of the market(s) the platform
operates in.
KEYWORDS: Networks, strategic interaction, network games, interventions, indus-
trial organisation, platforms. JEL classication: D4, L1, L4.




Many online platforms allow users to rate products on their platform. These ratings
have many potential uses, including revealing to buyers their own valuation for products
on oer. Another way in which product ratings are used is to determine the likelihood
that sellers are observed by buyers. Given that buyers do not tend to observe every
seller on a platform (see, for example, Ringer and Skiera, 2016 and Kim, Albuquerque
and Bronnenberg, 2010), the choice of which sellers buyers observe will aect platform
prots. Many online platforms use ratings as one of the inputs that determine how
search results are ordered (Dinerstein et al, 2018).1 We analyse the incentive of a prot-
maximising, monopolistic platform owner to use ratings as a means of determining the
prominence of a seller on a platform.
To give an example of the problem under consideration, suppose there is a market
with three products, X, Y and Z. Prior to the ratings of these products being realised,
the platform owner chooses the relative likelihood that products are observed given
their quality by choosing a observation function that maps quality into observation
probabilities. If X is more highly-rated than Y and Y is more highly-rated than Z, then
the platform's choice of observation function will determine how much more prominent
X is than Y and Z.2
To keep track of the price-setting behaviour of an arbitrarily large number of sellers
in which buyers observe sellers with some observation probability and the matrix of
1For an empirical assessment of the eect of ratings on consumer demand, see Chevalier and Mayzlin
(2006), Vana and Lambrecht (2020), Fradkin, Grewal and Holtz (2017) Luca (2016) and Ögut and
Tas (2009)
2 Prominence here refers to the probability that buyers observe a given seller. This approach
contrasts with Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2009) and Armstrong and Zhou (2011), where prominent
sellers are observed rst and either accepted or rejected in a search framework.
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such observation probabilities generates a network which in turn determines prices.
Our analysis therefore utilises results from the games on networks literature Ballester,
Calvò-Armengol and Zenou, 2006, and Bramoullé, Kranton and D'Amours, 2014) in a
setting where a platform can inuence (but not directly set) the links between sellers.3
Hence, this study ts into the growing interventions in networks literature.4
Using our framework, we nd that there is a high-level trade-o inherent with choos-
ing to positively weight the observation probabilities according to a product's rating.
On the one hand, there is an incentive to bias the search process towards highly-rated
sellers because doing so increases the probability that buyers observe high quality sell-
ers. Buyers also demand more of the products sold by highly-rated sellers for a given
set of prices, which implies that matching buyers to these sellers increases expected
prots, if prices were independent of the search process chosen by the platform owner.
However, making it more likely that highly-rated sellers are observed causes compe-
tition to become more concentrated across the network, in the sense that highly-rated
sellers are more likely to compete with each other than in the case where matches are
random. Fierce competition between a subset of the sellers in the network more than
osets the fact that sellers with a low rating are less likely to compete with one another.
Highly-rated sellers have a lower price than is the case where matching is random, and
all sellers on platform, including those with low ratings, respond by reducing their prices
as well.
3See Bimpikis, Ehsani and Ilkiliç, 2018 and Elliott and Galeotti, 2019 for applications of this
literature to an IO context.
4 Contributions to the wider intervention in economic networks literature include: Galeotti and
Goyal (2009), Candogan, Bimpikis, and Ozdaglar (2012), Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duo, and Duo
(2013), Bloch and Querou (2013), Leduc, Jackson, and Johari (2017), Li (2019), Belhaj, Deroïan and
Sa (2020), Galeotti, Golub and Goyal (2020) and Akbarpour, Malladi, and Saberi (2020).
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Our setting also makes it possible to characterise the type of markets in which bi-
asing search results more towards high quality products is benecial. In markets where
product substitutability is relatively low or where product quality is relatively impor-
tant, the concentration of competition eect described above becomes less important,
driving up the optimal prominence of high quality
Similarly, as the variance of the component of the buyers' valuation that is idiosyn-
cratic increases, the less the platform owner has the incentive to bias search results.
Making high quality sellers prominent increases the probability that buyers miss out
on high quality matches with a surplus largely composed of the buyer's idiosyncratic
preference towards the product. Our analysis therefore suggests that the nature of the
market or markets that the platform hosts is crucial for determining the extent to which
ratings are used to rank products.
Our result that there are potential ex-ante gains for the platform owner generated
by consumers observing high quality products shares features with the results found in
work analysing the incentive of monopolists to reveal information relating to consumer
valuations, like Lewis and Sappington (1994) and Myatt and Johnson (2006).
By focusing on a monopolistic platform, we identify a trade-o that becomes in-
creasingly important as individual platforms become dominant. As such platforms gain
signicant market share, their ability to shape intra-platform competition becomes more
important, something in which regulators are increasingly taking an interest.5Our focus
on intra-platform competition then diers from the more common approach of exam-
ining inter-platform competition, leading to a more thorough consideration of the fact
5See, for example, the European Commission's recent preliminary nding that Amazon breached
EU antitrust rules by distorting competition on its own platform by using privately held data to the
benet of its own retail oering and its investigation in to Amazon's buy box (European Commission,
2020)
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that modern platforms are hosts to a market which they can inuence. While there
have been some recent analyses to intra-platform competition from a management per-
spective (Zhu and Liu (2018 and Nambisan and Baron, 2019), there has been less focus
on this aspect of platforms in economics. An exception to this is Choi, Dai and Kim
(2018), who analyse the case in which oligopolists compete on prices when prices partly
determine the probability of being observed, but do not explicitly examine the question
of platform design.6
Charlson (2020) also examines internal competition on platforms, but examines
the case where the platform owner has full control over which buyers observe which
sellers, and seller ratings do not play an explicit role. Here, we examine the case
where ratings are the only means of the platform being able to determine relative
observability, identifying a trade-o between protable matches and competition that
real-life platforms face.
Recent work by Armstrong and Zhou (2020) and Elliott, Galleotti and Koh (2020)
has examined how platform owners can increase prots by segmenting the market via
limiting the information sellers have about consumer valuations.7 Our framework anal-
yses an alternative method of segmentation achieved via changing the probability that
buyers observe sellers.
Due to the concentration of competition eect described above, the platform prefers
to show consumers high quality sellers less than a consumer surplus maximising central
planner. Competition authorities should pay close attention what determines promi-
nence in search on online platforms. In cases where they are concerns of monopolistic
6For canonical approaches to inter-platform competition, see Tirole and Rochet (2003) Armstrong
(2006) and Tan and Zhou (2019).
7These approaches our part of a wider literature on Bayesian persuasion Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011), which has been applied to IO contexts in e.g. Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2015) and
Chen and Zhang (2020)
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behaviour, requiring transparency regarding the inputs of the algorithm used to deter-
mine the results of internal search may be required.
2 The model
Suppose that there are a nite number of consumer segments, each composed of po-
tentially a large but nite number of buyers. Each buyer within a consumer segment
shares some trait, such as geographical location, age demographic, occupation etc. Call
the set of these consumer segments B and suppose that |B| = n. Let S be a nite
set of sellers and where |S| = m. Sellers each sell a single type of completely divisible
good, and each seller's good is an imperfect substitute for each of the goods.
Sellers and consumer segments interact on a platform. A consumer segment, i,
observes a seller j with probability wij, which is generated by an observation function
discussed below. The observation process generates a weighted network G = (B∪S,E),
where E is the set of weighted edges from S to B, where each consumer segment can
be thought of as a node in the graph G. G has an adjacency matrix, R, which is a
zero-diagonal matrix with components wij.
Let p denote a m× 1 vector whose jth entry is pj ∈ R+, the price of j's good. We
will assume that the ex-post demand function, xij(p) : Rm → R+, captures the demand
of a group of buyers i for a product j condition on i observing j:




where b, c ∈ R+ and µik = 1 if i observes k and 0 otherwise. We will suppose throughout
that each γij is stochastic. More specically, assume that:
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γij = θγj + εij,
where both γj and εij are random iid variables with continuous and symmetric distri-
bution supported on bounded intervals [γL, γH ] and [εL, εH ], with means γ̄ and 0 and
variances σ2γ > 0 and σ
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ε ≥ 0 respectively. The rst of these terms can be thought of
capturing the quality of product j, whereas the second captures the idiosyncratic value
consumer i derives from j.
The parameter θ ∈ R+ then captures the extent to which consumer segments value
quality relative to their idiosyncratic assessment of the good. We will assume that all
of the elements of the buyer's demand function, which are non-stochastic, including θ,
are common knowledge. We also assume that xij > 0, which is guaranteed when b is
suciently large, the conditions for which we discuss in more detail below.
Once the value of each γij is realised, consumer segment i's ex-ante expected demand
function for a good j can be represented by E[xij(p, γij)] : Rm+1 → R:




Dene as j's expected demand function, E[xj(p)] : Rm → R+ as E[xj(p)] =
∑n
i=1 E[xij(p)].
Then, assuming the marginal cost of each seller is zero, the prot function for seller j
is E[πj(p)] = pjE[xj(p)].
Sellers are assumed to observe the entire graph G: they observe the matrix of
observation probabilities. On the basis of this observation, sellers choose their prices.
A seller, j, is assumed not to be able to price discriminate across buyers, and hence
each sets a single price pj ∈ R+. Sellers compete with one another on price, and set





πj(pj, p_j ; G).
Having characterised the game played by the sellers given the graph G, it is necessary






We assume that the rating of a product is determined by previous buyers of that
product truthfully revealing their intercept parameters. By the law of large numbers,
as n→∞, γ̂j →p γj. We will assume throughout that n is suciently large such that
γ̂j is arbitrarily close to γj.
The platform and the observation function
Having set out the demand function of the buyers, it is necessary to outline the obser-
vation process. Let γ̂−j be a (m− 1)× 1 vector that contains every seller rating except
for j. We will assume that the probability that a buyer i observes a seller j, wij, is
determined as follows:
wij(γ̂) = φ(γ̂j, γ̂−j) ∀i, j (1)
where φ(γ̂j, γ̂−j) : Rm → [0, 1] is a observation function that maps the rating of each
seller to an observation probability for the seller j. Given the equilibrium price setting
behaviour and a set of conditions which we outline below the platform owner is assumed
to choose a observation function φ(.) ∈ Φ, where Φ is the set of all feasible observation
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functions, φ(., .) to solve the following problem:8
maxφ(.)∈Φ{Eφ[π
∗








P (p)] is the expected platform prot when the observation function is φ(.)
and 0 ≤ χ ≤ 1. We will assume throughout that the platform chooses φ(γ̂j, γ̂−j)
prior to the realisation of the ratings vector. Hence, the timing of the model can be
summarised as follows: the platform owner chooses φ(.); the ratings vector γ̂ is realised,
generating a graph G; sellers set p∗; and nally the observation graph is realised and
consumer segments purchase products according to their ex-post demand function.
3 Determining observation probabilities
Equation (1) denes an observation function that determines the probability that each
consumer segment observes each seller. Let Φ represent the set of all feasible obser-
vation functions. Throughout, we will assume that any φ(.) ∈ Φ obeys the following
conditions:
(C1) Competitor symmetry. For any i, j, k,with j 6= i, k, γ̂i and γ̂k enter φ(γ̂j, γ̂−j)
identically for all j.
(C2) Distributional symmetry. Suppose γ̂b = γ̄ + z and γ̂s = γ̄ − z. For any
φ(γ̂j, γ̂−j) ∈ Φ, it must be the case that if |φ(γ̂b, γ̂−j) − φ(γ̄, γ̂−j)| =
|φ(γ̂s, γ̂−j)− φ(γ̄, γ̂−j)|.
8Throughout, we use Eφ[] to refer to the expectation of some function when the observation function
is φ(.). Any expectations without this notation refer to the expectation of some variable or function
after the realisation of the ratings vector but prior to the realisation of the observation graph.
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(C3) Continuity and dierentibility. φ(γ̂j, γ̂−j) is continuous and dierentiable
on its entire domain.
Of these three conditions, (C2) is the most restrictive. Intuitively, this condition reduces
the platform owner's ability to exclude products with low ratings from being observed at
all. While such a condition likely does meaningfully bind the platform owner's decision,
it is a simplication that allows us to understand the key trade-os between competition
and matching concerns.
When (C1)-(C3) hold, noting that each γj is distributed symmetrically, any φ(.) ∈ Φ
generates a set of random variables w̃ij as follows:
w̃ij =d υ + εj,
where υ ∈ [0, 1] and each εj is identically and independently distributed according to
some bounded, symmetric and continuous distribution with mean 0. The scalar υ can
be thought of as the baseline probability with which each segment observes each seller,
which is adjusted up or downwards depending on a segment's quality.
Loosely, the extent to which ratings are used to determine observation probabilities
can be used to categorise dierent functions within the set Φ as generating ratings-
based matching environments, where the probability that high-quality sellers are ob-
served with a higher probability, or random match environments, where the matching
probabilities are even or near even. These two environments generate dierent struc-
tures for a given realisation of the rankings vector γ̂, as Figure 1 shows.
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Figure 1: Ratings-based and random match environments where the product quality
parameters are as follows: γ̂A > γ̂B > γ̂C . The thicker a line, the higher the probability
of observation.
4 The price setting equilibrium
The competition graph
To characterise the equilibrium price vector of the sellers competing in G, it should be
noted that buyers are not strategic agents in the game, and therefore it is possible to
dene a network which is strategically equivalent to an original network G, but only
includes seller nodes. Such a network can be used to characterise the equilibrium of the
pricing game. Dene:
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i=1[wijwik]γik and βj := b
∑n
i=1wij.
Transforming the above prot function to put it in terms of a seller-only network
yields the following payo function for seller j:




Rescaling (6) by 1/βi and multiplying by
1
2















. The maximisation problem maxpi π̃i(pi) has the same
rst-order condition as maxpi πi(pi). Dene RS as a symmetric zero diagonal matrix of
a network GS with entries c̃jk. This transformation yields a competition network, GS,
which is a projection of G.9
The links in GS represent the relative importance of the connection between two
sellers. Hence, this representation allows us to track the competition faced by each
seller tractably, even if the number of sellers is arbitrarily large.
The structure of the competition network is of course shaped by the observation
function. When the observation function is relatively insensitive to ratings, the com-
petition graph generated is such that the links between each seller are of near-equal
value.
When the observation function is relatively sensitive to rating, GS is such that the
links between highly-rated sellers are larger than the links between lowly-rated sellers.
Furthermore, the directed link from a highly-rated seller to a lowly-rated seller is smaller
9Charlson (2020) also relies on the transformation between a bipartite buyer-seller graph and a
competition network. However, here the competition network is determined by an observation, rather
than directly by the platform owner.
12
than the equivalent link in the other direction. Highly-rated sellers face relatively less
competition from lowly-rated sellers than the reverse, because lowly-rated sellers are
less likely to have captive or near-captive buyers.
Figure 2 shows the competition graphs generated in these two cases.
Figure 2: The eect on the competition graph when the observation function is insensi-
tive (left) and sensitive (right) to ratings, where the product quality parameters are as
follows: γ̂X = γ̂Y > γ̂Z . The thicker a line, the higher the competitive overlap between
the two sellers.
Equilibrium
Let γl := θγL+ εL and γh := θγH + εH . To ensure that there exists a unique equilibrium
in this setting, we assume the following throughout:




(A1) guarantees both that the substitutability parameter c is not too large relative to
the own-price elasticity parameter b and that xij > 0 for any realisation of the quality
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parameter vector γ and the random bipartite graph G.
Let α̃ represent a m × 1 vector with element j equal to α̃j and, abusing notation
slightly, let C = C(RS,1),where C(RS,1) = [I − RS]−1 is the Bonacich centrality of
GS with a decay factor of 1. The following result holds:
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Proposition 1. If (A1) holds, then the above pricing game has a unique Nash equilib-
rium in pure strategies, which is the equilibrium price vector:
Eφ[p
∗] = θ(E[γ]− 1
2
Eφ[Cγ]).
As E[Cγ] = covφ(C,γ) +Eφ[C]E[γ], and covφ(C,γ) ≥ 0 when γ̂j > γ̂k then wij ≥ wik
(which, as we will see, is optimal for the platform), seller j's expected price is decreasing
in their weighted expected Bonacich centrality for all j.
Network structure and concentrated competition
The equilibrium behaviour of sellers implied by Proposition 1 implies that the structure
of the network aects prots. The observation probabilities can be thought of as a
measure of prominence in the sense that they capture the likelihood that the seller is
observed by a given buyer. Increasing a seller j's prominence in the network potentially
increases prots as a result of increasing the probability of sales, but at the same time
it imposes a cost on the rest of the network by increasing competition, reducing prices
of every seller, including for the more prominent seller.
10All proofs can be found in the appendix.
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As the number of sellers and the centrality of those sellers in the in the network GS
increases, wij > wik has an increasingly large eect on prices. The centrality vector in





It follows that ∂
2Ck
∂2wij
> 0. Recall that seller prices are falling in the centrality of the
sellers in this setting. Hence, setting wij > wik imposes a cost upon the platform owner
because the centrality measure has a feedback eect such that increasing an observation
probability wij (weakly) reduces j's price, which reduces k's price which then reduces
j's price and so on. This feedback eect, which is a feature of the Bonacich centrality
measure, is increasing as the centralities of the sellers in GS become larger.
Furthermore, the fact that the second derivative of the centrality vector is positive
implies that two or more sellers also has a disproportionately large eect on competition.
As the prominence of seller X and a seller Y increase, then the size of paths of length
l ≥ 2 that run from X to Y and then Y to X (or vice versa) increases more than
linearly. The increase in the size of these paths then increases the centrality of every
other seller in the network, decreasing prices.
The above analysis indicates that two or more sellers being in relatively intense
competition with one another is disproportionately costly for the platform owner. We
refer to the case where there is relatively intense competition between a subset of the
sellers on the network as one in which competition is concentrated. There being a larger
probability that high quality sellers compete with one another drives the prices of those
sellers down, which propagates across the entire network.
In terms of the observation function, as
∂φj(.)
∂γ̂j
increases, the concentration of compe-
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tition also increases, as the probability that two highly-rated sellers compete with one
another increases. This has implications for the seller in terms of prot, which in turn
shapes the optimal observation function φ(.) from the platform owner's perspective.
5 Weighting ratings
We will consider the case where the platform owner is chooses optimal observation
function from a set of such functions that all adhere to (C1)-(C3). Notice that under
the specied observation probability formation process, wij = wlj for all i, l pairs, and
it is therefore not possible for the platform to dierentiate between dierent buyers.
To understand some of the trade-os inherent in the platform owner's maximisation
problem, it is useful to suppose at rst that the platform owner can only choose υ, such
that εj = 0 for all j with probability 1. The platform owner's problem can then be
re-stated as follows:
maxυEυ[πP (p)],
where Eυ[.] is the expectation function when the baseline probability is υ and εj = 0
for all j with probability 1. An increase in υ has two eects on prots. Increasing υ
increases the probability that a given buyer is observed increases expected sales, which
increases prots. However, there is a cost to increasing υ: it results in there being a
higher probability that buyers observe more sellers, which creates more competition
across the network. More competition reduces demand for any one good and reduces
prices, decreasing prots as well.
To see the trade-o the platform owner faces more formally, we will split the marginal
eect of υ into two parts. At the equilibrium value of υ, the marginal increase in prots
associated with an increase in the probability that each buyer observes each seller can,
16




bp∗j(θγj − p∗j ].

















When the solution is interior, the platform owner's prot is maximised when the
marginal benet and marginal cost sum to zero. Letting ῡ denote a solution to the
optimisation problem above, Proposition 2 sets out the solution to that problem:
Proposition 2. There exists a unique solution to maxυEυ[πP (p)], 0 < ῡ ≤ 1. Further-
more, ῡ is decreasing in c, and hence there exists a c̄ ∈ R+ such that if c > c̄, then
ῡ < 1.
Seller, j's equilibrium price is decreasing in their Bonacich centrality, which is convex in
υ. Hence, the marginal cost associated with increasing υ is convex, while the equivalent
marginal benet is linear. Hence, either the two meet at some ῡ < 1 or there is a corner
solution such that ῡ = 1; either way, there exists is a unique solution to the seller's
problem.
Increasing υ increases the level of competition in the network. If c is suciently
high, then products are so substitutable that the platform owner is willing to forgo some
of the prot associated with buyers observing sellers for certain in order to increase
prices. The platform owner faces a trade-o between expected sales on the one hand
and competition and lower prices on the other.
Now, consider the case where the platform owner maximises their prot by choosing
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an element of the set Φ. As discussed above, doing so involves generating a distribution
of observation weights centered around a mean, υ. It is useful to compare the mean, υ,
of a solution to the platform owner's optimisation problem in the case where they can
choose any element of the set Φ and ῡ :
Theorem 1. Suppose c > c̄ and hence ῡ < 1, and that every element in Φ satises
(C1)-(C3). Then, for any optimal observation function, φ∗(.), it must be the case that:
(i) if γ̂j > γ̂k then wij ≥ wik for all i, j, k with the inequality strict for some γ̂j and γ̂k
and (ii) υ∗ < ῡ.
The platform owner has an incentive to ensure that there is a greater probability that
highly-rated products are observed for a given level of υ and γ̂−j . Buyers demand more
high quality products for a given price level. Hence, if they are also more likely to
observe those products, then the platform owner's prot is increasing in the variance
of the quality parameter, holding prices constant.
At the same time, setting wij ≥ wik has implications for the structure of competition
on the network. As discussed above, making a seller more prominent concentrates
competition. Highly-rated sellers are more likely to compete with one another, as a
result of the fact that they are more likely to be observed. Concentrated competition
decreases expected prices and therefore expected prot.
Hence, the platform owner faces a trade-o between the increased revenue (holding
prices constant) resulting from buyers observing high quality sellers and the fact that
increasing the probability highly-rated sellers are observed increases competition. As-
suming the optimal network structure when observation probabilities are equal is not
just the complete graph (i.e. assuming ῡ < 1),then this trade-o is resolved such that
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at least some more highly-rated sellers are more likely to be observed than relatively
low quality sellers.
In order to alleviate some of the decrease in price associated with making some
sellers more prominent than others, the platform owner has an incentive to decrease
the probability that every seller is observed by reducing υ. Hence, υ∗ < ῡ. The platform
reduces the baseline probability that a given product is observed in order to reduce the
price eects of biasing search towards high quality products.
Prices and comparative statics
The above analysis raises the question: what is the eect of biasing search results
towards high quality sellers on prices? Let φ̄ represent the optimal observation function
where εj = 0 for all j with probability 1, and hence υ = ῡ. The following proposition
holds:
Proposition 3. Suppose every element in Φ satises (C1)-(C3). If ῡ < 1, then there
exists a c̃ ∈ R+ such that if c < c̃, then for an optimal vector of observation functions
φ∗, then Eφ∗ [p] < Eφ̄[p].
For a given baseline observation probability, υ, making some sellers more prominent
than others results in a reduction in prices, as discussed above.
In response to this distortion in competition, the platform owner reduces υ such that
it is below ῡ, which in turn increases expected prices. However, when substitutability
between products is not too large, this eect is guaranteed not to fully compensate for
the eect generated by the competition becoming more concentrated. Hence, prices
fall in expectation; the platform owner is willing to lower expected prices in order to
increase the probability of high-surplus matches.
19
It also useful to consider the eect of a change in c and θ on the weight the platform






= κ for all γ̂j and γ̂−j .
(C2
′
) limits the platform owner to choosing linear observation functions. The previous
analysis implies that κ > 0 and as κ increases, the greater the weight the observation
function places on ratings. Limiting the eect ratings have on the observation function
to a single parameter allows us to make more intuitive claims about the eect of changes
to other parameters in the model.
To this end, it is useful to write the largest κ associated with any element of the
set of optimal observation functions, Φ∗, as κ∗ = κ∗(c, θ, σε). The following comparative
statics hold:
Proposition 4. Suppose every element in Φ satises (C1),(C2
′








As the sellers' goods become more substitutable, the cost of a given level of competitive
overlap between the sellers increases. Hence, as c increases, prices are lower for a given




> 0. Highly-rated sellers compete with one another with higher
probability when κ > 0, and the relative strength of this competition eect is increasing
in product substitutability.





j(γ̂j − γ̄)(γj) > 0 and (b)
∂p∗j
∂θ




Intuitively, as the extent to which buyers value quality increases, the value of matching
buyers with high quality products also increases, which implies that the optimal value
of κ rises.
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We can also use our framework to analyse the eect of an increase in σε, the variance
in idiosyncratic preferences. Theorem 2 sets this out:
Theorem 2. Suppose (C1), (C2
′
) and (C3) hold. If ῡ < 1 and σ
′








As j's price and i's demand is increasing in εij, j's expected prot is convex in εij,
a result consistent with Myatt and Johnson (2006). Thus, when the additional prot
generated from a positive realisation of εij is greater than the loss in prot associated
with a negative realisation of εij.
The result of this feature of the platform owner's prot function means that as
σε increases, so too does the platform owner's incentive to increase υ. Increasing the
baseline probability that consumer segments observe sellers results in an increase in
expected prot as it reduces the probability that a consumer segment does not observe
a high-surplus idiosyncratic match, which in turn is more protable than a equivalently
low-surplus match. This is akin to the platform owner expanding the expected size of
the consumer segments' information sets in the Myatt and Johnson framework.
Increasing the baseline probability υ is costly in terms of its eect on prices, and
hence the platform owner is incentivised to reduce the extent to which observation
is biased towards high quality sellers. Hence, as σε increases, sellers are on average
observed with higher probability and the dierence between how likely it is high and
low quality products are observed gets smaller.
6 Consumer welfare
Thus far we have analysed the extent to which biasing the search process towards high
quality sellers increases prots. We now consider consumer welfare by assessing the
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eect of changes to the matching environment on consumer surplus. We dene i's
























∗) = CS(x∗;p∗), where x∗ is an n×mmatrix whose ijth component
is x∗ij. Suppose that the central planner solves the following maximisation problem:
maxφ{Eφ[CS(x∗,p∗)]}.
Let ΦCP denote the set of solution to this maximisation problem. The following propo-
sition holds:
Proposition 5. Suppose every element in Φ satises (C1)-(C3). Any φ(.) ∈ ΦCP is
such that υ = 1 and hence Eφ[wij] = 1 for all i, j pairs.
Increasing an observation probability wij increases consumer surplus because it both
increases the probability of surplus-increasing sales and reduces prices across the net-
work. The platform owner therefore harms consumer surplus if they reduce υ below 1,
which they may have an incentive to do in order to increase prices.
Now, consider the case where the central planner and/or platform cannot choose
the baseline probability υ, supposing this is xed by nature at υ̂. Under that condition,
any element of the set Φ must result in each w̃ij =d υ̂ + εj, for some symmetrically
distributed random variable εj with mean 0. We term the condition (C4), under which
we can compare the platform owner and central planner's preferences for observation
functions.
Theorem 3. Suppose every element in Φ satises (C1)-(C4) for some υ, υ̂. Take any
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φ(.) ∈ Φ∗. If there exists a φ′(.) ∈ Φ∗ under which: (a) γ̂j > γ̂k implies that wij ≥ wik
for all i, j, k and (b) the distribution of εj is a mean preserving spread of the distribution
of εj generated by φ(.), then: Eφ′ [CS(x
∗,p∗)] > Eφ[CS(x
∗,p∗)].
If there exists a feasible observation function where high quality sellers are more likely to
be observed than low quality sellers and that produces a mean-preserving spread of some
other observation function, the central planner will always prefer the rst observation
function. This is because, for that observation function, prices are in expectation lower,
and demand higher, due to the concentration in competition eect.
For the platform owner, as has been discussed, increasing the extent to which
searches are biased towards high quality sellers is costly to prots due to this same
price eect.The platform owner at least weakly prefers distributions of observation
probabilities which are mean preserving contractions of those distributions preferred by
the central planner. Such a preference comes at the cost of consumer welfare.
7 Discussion
Our analysis explains why online platform use ratings dierently to determine which
sellers are more likely to be observed by buyers. In general, the platform owner faces a
trade-o between increased competition and lower expected prices on the one hand and
an increase in prots due to matching on the other. The extent to which the platform
owner has an incentive to bias their search process towards highly-rated sellers depends
on the nature of the goods being sold on the platform.
To expand on this point, we compare the importance of product quality and the
variance of the idiosyncratic preferences of dierent goods commonly sold on online
platforms in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: A comparison of dierent types of markets according to their values of im-
portance of quality and the variance in idiosyncratic preferences
When platforms oer (or predominately oer) products with low values of θ, the con-
centrated competition eect identied in Section 6, whereby using ratings to determine
observation probabilities increases the eective level of competition across the market,
dominates. When the ex-post dierence between the valuations of the sellers is low, the
expected reduction in prices associated with biasing observation towards high-quality
sellers outweighs any potential benets associated with a ratings-based environment,
which implies that it is relatively less protable than a random match environment.
For products that have high idiosyncratic variance but relatively low expected dif-
ferences in quality, a random match (or near random match) environment is relatively
more protable than the ratings-based environment. This is because there is an increas-
ing probability of high-surplus matches driven by the convexity of the prot function.
On the other hand, the relative prot associated with high-quality sellers being ob-
served with a high probability increases as θ increases, as a result of the same convexity
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in prot function. Hence, in such environments, the ratings-based environment would
be more protable.
To represent the above discussion graphically, suppose that (C2
′
) holds. If κ > κ̄ for
some arbitrary κ̄ ∈ R+, then we dene the observation process as being ratings based.
If κ∗ ≤ κ̄, let the search process be known as random match. Figure 4 then depicts
where ratings-based and random matching observation processes would be optimal in
θ − σε space:
Figure 4: A comparison of the random match and ratings-based environments: in
markets above the solid line, a ratings-based observation process is optimal, below it,
random matching.
Figure 4 makes clear that platforms that (largely) host markets where product quality
is less important to consumers should use an information environment that weights
ratings less than platforms where product quality is more important to consumers. It
is possible to approximate the positions of real-life platforms within the space shown in
25
Figure 4, which is shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: A comparison of the random match and ratings-based environments. For any
market above the solid line, prots are higher in ratings-based environments.
Our analysis also makes it possible to assess some contemporary issues and debates
within the regulation of platforms. For example, the European Commission has recently
begun investigating the extent to which Amazon biases its search results towards its
own products. Not only does this have clear implications for which sellers are successful
on the platform, but it also has eect on competition more broadly.
In terms of the model here, if the platform sets probability that a preferred seller(s),
j, is observed by all buyers to some higher than average value wij = υ
′
, then the platform
has an incentive to lower the baseline probability that other sellers are observed and
reduces the extent to which high quality sellers are observed. This not only arises
because this decreases the competition faced by the preferred seller, but because there
being an especially prominent seller increases the concentration of competition across
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the network, which can be oset by reducing the bias placed on ratings by internal
search algorithms.
8 Conclusion
Using seller ratings to order search shapes the structure of competition on a platform
hosting a marketplace. Empirical evidence makes clear that there the extent to which
seller ratings are used to order search results diers considerably between platforms,
and the aim of our analysis has been to understand what drives these dierences.
There is a trade-o that the platform owner faces when using seller ratings to order
search results. Increasing the extent to which sellers that are highly-rated are observed
by buyers is potentially prot increasing because buyers are more likely to be matched
with a high quality product, increasing willingness to pay.
At the same time, biasing search towards highly-rated sellers has the eect of concen-
trating competition among those sellers, which results in lower expected prices across
the network. The platform owner resolves this trade-o in the case where they can
freely choose the extent to which they bias their search results by limiting the use of
ratings in the search process. As products become more substitutable, or consumers
become less sensitive to product quality, the platform owner has an incentive to reduce
the extent to which the search process is biased towards highly-rated products.
Our analysis generates a number of predictions that would be worthwhile exploring
empirically, including:
1. Platforms selling products where perceived or actual quality is more important
will use ratings as a larger component of their search process;
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2. Platforms selling products with high idiosyncratic variance will use ratings as a
smaller component of their search process;
3. Revealing product rankings reduces prices within given platform or market;
4. Platforms selling relatively homogeneous products will use ratings as a smaller
component of their search process.
Our results also indicate that competition authorities should pay close attention to
what determines prominence within the search processes of online platforms. As plat-
forms like Amazon become increasing dominant, the incentive and ability to inuence
competition by changing which buyers see which sellers increases. Greater transparency
regarding the inputs of the algorithms that determine prominence would be needed for
authorities to understand real-world platform incentives and reduce the potential for
anti-competitive behaviour.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
It can be readily shown that the rst-order condition (and therefore the resulting op-
timisation problem) for the payo vector π̃ is equivalent to the rst-order condition of
the payo vector associated with the original payo vector π. The rst-order condition
of the payo vector is as follows:
α̃ = [I −RS]p.
The matrix I−RS is positive denite (by (A1)), non-singular and the above rst-order
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condition has a solution, which is denoted p∗. Rearranging this rst-order condition
leads to the following: [I −RS]−1α̃ = p∗.
As I −RS is positive denite, the stated rst-order condition above yields a unique
interior solution. Furthermore, no corner solutions can exist, due to the fact that (A1)
guarantees that xij > 0 for all i, j pairs. This implies that if p
∗
j = 0 in some price vector
p,p is not optimal price vector. This is because there exists a ε > 0 such that p
′
j = ε









k=1 ĉjk. Noting that E[εij] = 0 that each γj and






















Proof of Proposition 2







ij (RS) measures the weighted paths of length l that start at node i and end at node








Each expected centrality is convex in υ, as
∂2E[Cj(RS ,1)
∂2υ
> 0. As the expected equilibrium
price vector is decreasing in the expected centrality of each seller j, this implies that the
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expected price vector is strictly concave in υ. This implies that the platform owner's





























< 0 for all pi, all three of the terms on the right-hand side of
this expression are negative, which implies that
d2π∗k
dυ2
< 0 for all k. Hence, if the solution
of the rst-order conditions of the platform owner's prot maximisation problem is
interior, it represents a unique, global optimum, where 0 < υ∗ < 1. Furthermore, if
d2π∗P
d2υ
> 0 when υ = 1, then υ = 1 is an optimal solution as υ ∈ [0, 1].










k − θγk)] features in MCυ. (A1) dictates
that bE[γj] > c
∑
k E[γk], but at υ = 1, there exists a c such that 2c
∑
k E[γk] > bE[γj] >
c
∑
k E[γk], holds. This is sucient to guarantee that MBυ −MCυ < 0, when υ = 1,
and hence there exists a c̄ such that if c > c̄, υ∗ < 1.
Proof of Theorem 1
For (i), we consider the eect of a marginal increase in the probability that j is observed,
by a consumer i, wij = wj, once ratings have been realised. Note that each seller j's
prot function is twice dierentiable and continuous, and
∂2πj
∂2pj
< 0. As per Milgrom and
Segal (2002), these are jointly sucient conditions for the envelope theorem to apply,

































> 0 for γj ∈ [γL, γH ].





< 0 for at least some
γ̂
′
j ∈ [γL, γH ] and some vector γ̂−j . The optimal function having this property is a
necessary and sucient condition for it to be the case that there exists a pair of ratings











< 0, then there always exists a
φ̂j(., .) ∈ Φ where φ̂j(γ̂j, γ̂−j) < φ̃j(γ̂j, γ̂−j) for all γ̂j ≤ γ̂
′
j, φ̂j(γ̂j, γ̂−j) ≥ φ̃j(γ̂j, γ̂−j) for
all γ̂j > γ̂
′
j and E[πP (p
∗)|φ̃] < E[πP (p∗)|φ̂]. Hence the rst statement in (i) is proved.
For the claim that for any optimal observation function it must be the case that for
a given γ̂−j ,
∂φ∗j (γ̂j ,γ̂−j)
∂γ̂j
> 0 for at least some γ̂j ∈ [γL, γH ], note rst that υ∗ < ῡ < 1,
as shown below. As we have ruled out the case where
∂φ∗j (γ̂j ,γ̂−j)
∂γ̂j




= 0 for all γ̂j ∈ [γL, γH ] is suboptimal.
If for a given γ̂−j ,
∂φ̃j(γ̂j ,γ̂−j)
∂γ̂j
= 0 for γ̂j ∈ [γL, γH ], then wij = w for all i and j pairs.
As υ∗ < ῡ < 1, it must be the case that for any candidate observation function, φ̃j(.),





> 0 for γj ∈ [γL, γH ] when wj < 1,
it follows that there exists a observation function where φ̂j(γ̂L, γ̂−j) < w < φ̂j(γ̂H , γ̂−j)
and E[πP (p
∗)|φ̃] < E[πP (p∗)|φ̂].
For (ii), recall that for any φ ∈ Φ, we can write observation probabilities as wij =d
υ + εj for all i and j. Suppose that εj is distributed in accordance to some optimal









| where fD is the degenerate distribution in which εj = 0 with
probability 1.
Furthermore, as increasing υ increases the probability that every seller is observed







for all values of υ ∈ [υ,ῡ], where υ and ῡ are the lowest
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and highest values of υ consistent with εj ∼ f and the conditions (C1)-(C3) being met.
It follows that υ ≤ ῡ.
Proof of Proposition 3
As stated in the main text, any vector of observation functions φ that obey (C1)-(C3)
results in each wij =d υ + εj. Let ϑ
∗ denote the distribution of the vector of εjs,
ε induced by an optimal observation function φ∗(.) and ϑ0 the distribution induced
by the φ̄: i.e. where εj = 0 for all j. Let υ̃ denote the υ that solves the following
expression:
Eυ,ϑ0 [pj] = Eυ̃,ϑ∗ [pj].
By the envelope theorem, the marginal eect of increasing υ at υ = υ
′



























< 0, as each seller j's prot function includes the expression
nυ2
∑
k 6=j c(pk− γik), which is negative by denition. As the conditional expectation of
the term
∑




| < |Eῡ,ϑ0 [πj(p)]
∂υ
|







above. To assess this







. Paths of length 2 in the expression Eυ′ ,ϑ[Cj] are
all functions of υ2, E[υεi] for all i and (
c
b
)2. As E[υεi] = 0, it follows that the derivative
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of the value of all paths of length l ≤ 2 with respect to υ is strictly increasing in υ for
all distributions of ε.
Furthermore, note that c
b
< 1. So while paths of length l > 2 are a function of E[εki ]
with k > 2, any such path is a function of ( c
b
)l. Hence, there exists a c̃ such that if




| < |∂Eῡ,ϑ0 [Cj]
∂υ
| ∀j.

















The last equality holds by denition as ῡ maximises Eῡ,ϑ0 [π
∗
P (p)]. It follows that the








j ] < Eῡ,ϑ0 [p
∗
j ] ∀j.
Proof of Proposition 4
Consider the rst-order conditions of the platform owner's problem maxκ,υπ
∗
P (υ, κ),
which we express as follows: πκ :=
∂πP (υ,κ;θ,c)
∂κ
= 0 and πυ :=
∂πP (υ,κ;θ,c)
∂υ
= 0. These two
rst-order conditions provide a mapping from R4 → R2. Denote the Hessian of the






It is clear that ∂πκ
∂θ
> 0 and ∂πυ
∂θ


















A similar argument applies for c, with the dierence being that ∂πυ
∂c
< 0 and ∂πκ
∂c
< 0.




Proof of Theorem 2
For the purposes of our analysis, we rewrite the optimal price vector as a function of the
relevant parameters of the model, p∗ = p∗(υ, κ, ε). Recall that γij = θγj + εij. As εij
and γj are independent, εij does not aect the centrality vector of the graph generated









Given the denition of
∑
k α̃k, it is clear that this expression is postie and does not
include εij, and hence p
∗(υ, κ, ε) is linear and positive in each εij. Consider the ex-post
prots of a seller j:
πj(p




As pj and αj(υ, ε) are both increasing linear functions of εij, πj(p
∗, ε) is increasing in
ε2ij. By implicitly limiting the size of the eect on j's prot of each ε
2
ik k 6= j, (A1) then
guarantees that platform owner's expected prot is increasing in σ2ε = E[ε
2
ij].




element of seller prot functions that change as the result of a change in σε is s(υ, κ) :=
Eυ,κ[
∑
j pj(υ, κ, ε)αj(υ, ε)]. This holds because neither βj nor ĉjk are functions of ε and
p∗(υ, κ, ε) is linear in ε.
The previous discussion surrounding j's prot function combined with the fact that




, κ) − s(υ, κ) is
linearly increasing in σ2ε .
Recall that γj and εij are independent and that, as (C2
′
) holds, κ does not aect
E[αj(υ, ε)]. Hence, s(υ, κ
′
)− s(υ, κ) is independent of σ2ε for all κ
′
and κ.
















= 0 must be less than or equal to the largest κ that




= 0. Hence, κ∗(σε) ≥ κ∗(σ
′
ε).
Proof of Proposition 5




for all j. Furthermore,
∂Eφ[xij ]
∂υ
> 0. Dening the second part of the expression for CSi











Given (A1) holds and noting that E[p∗j ] = E[p
∗
k] = E[p
∗], both xij and yij(R) are
decreasing in E[p∗]. It must be the case that E[CSi(x
∗
i ;p
∗)] is maximised when v = 1
for all i, which proves the result.
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Proof of Theorem 3
Consider two distributions of εj, denoted ϑ and ϑ
′
, where ϑ is a mean-preserving spread
of ϑ
′




for all i, j, implying it is possible to write w̃ij =d w̃
′
ij + ζij,where ζij is symmetrically










each k ≥ 1 for some i, j pair. Noting that εij is symmetric by denition, it must be the
case that E[ζkij] = 0 when k is odd. Furthermore, E[ζ
k
ij] > 0 when k is even. It follows
that Eϑ′ [Cj(RS)] > Eϑ[Cj(RS)] ∀j.
Eφ[p
∗] = θ(E[γ]− 1
2
Eφ[Cγ]).
Consider two observation functions, φ(, ), φ
′
(, ) ∈ Φ, where the random observation







. Note that cov(w̃
′
ij, γj) = cov(w̃ij, γj) + cov(ζij,γj). As φ
′
(, ) is such that
γ̂j > γ̂k then wij ≥ wik for all i, j, k then cov(ζij, γj) > 0, and hence, cov(w̃
′
ij, γj) >
cov(w̃ij, γj). Thus, Eφ′ [Cγ] > Eφ[Cγ].





ij(p)]. Dene the function:






Where R is the adjacency matrix of the graph G when the observation function is φ(, ).
We can then write Eφ[x
∗








that E[w̃ij] = E[w̃
′
ij] by denition. Due to Eφ′ [pj] = Eφ′ [pk] and the fact that (A1) holds,














) is independent of xlk(R
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We can similarly analyse the second term in the expression for CSi:








and conclude that E[
∑




)]. Again, as cov(ζij,γj) > 0, the



























































And so Eφ′ [CSi] > Eφ[CSi]. The above analysis holds for all i, so Eφ′ [CS] > Eφ[CS].
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